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KIERKEGAARD AND PLANTINGA ON BELIEF IN
GOD: SUBJECTIVITY AS THE GROUND OF
PROPERLY BASIC RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
C. Stephen Evans

This paper compares the views and arguments of Alvin Plantinga and S0ren Kierkegaard
on the question of belief in God. Kierkegaard's view of belief in God (which must be
sharply distinguished from faith in the Absolute Paradox) is shown to be surprisingly
similar to Plantinga's claim that belief in God can be properly basic. Two of Plantinga's
arguments for taking belief in God as properly basic are shown to have analogues in
Kierkegaard.
Plantinga claims that though properly basic beliefs are not based on evidence they are
nevertheless grounded. In the latter part of the paper I show how the Kierkegaardian
notion of inwardness or subjectivity must be an essential element in any plausible account
of the ground of such belief in God.

Many philosophers would find it odd to consider together the views of Alvin
Plantinga, well-known contemporary analytic philosopher of religion, and S0ren
Kierkegaard, the nineteenth century religious thinker who is widely credited with
being the father of existentialism. In this paper I shall argue, however, that
beneath the very real differences in primary concerns and style that divide the
two thinkers, there is an underlying agreement on some central issues in the
philosophy of religion. Careful delineation of these points of agreement gives
us much clearer insight into each of these thinkers and what they are about.
Furthermore, with respect to areas where there are differences, some of the
differences are not disagreements but complementary insights. Each has something important to learn from the other.
I. The Notion of Belief in God as Properly Basic

In a very important article, "Reason and Belief in God,"l Alvin Plantinga has
argued, among other things, that belief in God is, at least for some people,
"properly basic." He wants to show that it can be "entirely acceptable, desirable,
right, proper, and rational to accept belief in God without any argument or
evidence whatever."2
This notion of "proper basicality" is explained by Planting a in terms of the
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concept of a person's "noetic structure," which is simply the set of propositions
a person believes, together with certain epistemic relations that hold among him
and these propositions."3 In a typical noetic structure, some propositions will be
believed on the basis of others. Obviously in many cases a belief which is the
basis for another may be itself based on some other belief. Those philosophers
which Plantinga terms "classical foundationalists"-and on this point Plantinga
is in sympathy with classical foundational ism-maintain that this "basing" relation cannot constitute an infinite series. Actual people must therefore believe
some things which are not based on other things they believe. If it is rational
for them to hold these beliefs in that manner, then Plantinga terms such beliefs
properly basic. The claim that belief in God is properly basic is therefore a claim
that it is reasonable to include belief in God as part of the foundation of a person's
noetic structure.
Actually, two qualifications must be made at this point. Plantinga recognizes
that there is a tremendous difference between belief in God and merely believing
in the proposition "God exists," yet it is the latter propositional belief which is
claimed to be properly basic. However, although belief in God is far more than
belief in the proposition "God exists," it does include such propositional belief.
Hence Plantinga's discussion of propositional belief is regarded by him as quite
relevant to actual religious faith. 4
The second qualification is that, strictly speaking, it is not the proposition
"God exists" which is properly basic, but propositions like "God is speaking to
me," "God has created me" and "God disapproves of what I have done."5 However, since propositions of this sort self-evidently entail that God exists, Plantinga
thinks there is no harm in speaking a bit loosely and talking as if the relatively
abstract, high-level proposition "God exists" is itself properly basic. 6
With these two qualifications in mind, I believe there is at least a prima facie
similarity between Plantinga's project here and the views of Kierkegaard, at least
if Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus accurately represents S. K. 's
thoughts, and I think that on this point he does. Kierkegaard would certainly
stress far more than Plantinga that genuine religious faith is not simply intellectual
assent to a proposition, but I do not think he would deny that faith contains
cognitive content. A person who believes in God certainly believes that there is
a God, just as a person who in faith follows Jesus as the God-man, believes that
Jesus exists and that Jesus is the God-man.
Kierkegaard would also, I think, welcome Plantinga's second qualification.
What is "properly basic" to a believer in God is not a "relatively abstract,
high-level proposition" like "God exists" but more concrete propositions like
"God is to be thanked for sending me this trial" and "God has forgiven me for
doing X."7
With the two qualifications given, however, Kierkegaard's perspective is really
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very similar. Since Kierkegaard stresses so strongly that faith in Jesus as the
God-man is "absurd," and goes "against reason," it is often unnoticed, I think,
that he does not usually say things like this about belief in God. (In this paper
I am focusing solely on belief in God, rather than the paradoxical belief in the
God-man.) Rather he seems to believe that a person can have a kind of awareness
and even certainty of God's reality, though one which is emphatically not based
on intellectual arguments or proofs.
It is true that Johannes Climacus does say very clearly that God cannot be
directly present to a person in a sensuous manner. The idea that God can be
directly experienced in this way is characterized as paganism. 8 However, this
by no means implies that Climacus does not think a person can be aware of
God's reality. Nor does his critique of natural theology in Chapter III of the
Fragments and elsewhere deny this. In fact, one of the major criticisms of natural
theology is simply that it makes something which should be certain appear to
be uncertain. It gives the impression that one needs an argument to recognize a
truth which is, one might say, right before one's nose.
For to demonstrate the existence (Tiltwr) of one who is present (er til,
exists) is the most shameless affront, since it is an attempt to make him
ridiculous; ... How could it occur to one to demonstrate that he exists
(er til), unless it is because one has first permitted oneself to ignore
him; and now makes the matter still more crazy by demonstrating his
existence (Tiltwreise) before his very nose? A king's existence (TilJa'relse) or his presence (Tilstedetwrelse) generally has its own characteristic expression of SUbjection and submission; what if one in his
sublime presence (Naena!relse) wanted to prove that he existed (var
til)? Would one then prove it? No, one makes a fool of him, for his
presence (TilstedeJa'relse) is demonstrated by an expression of submission ... and thus one also demonstrates God's existence (Til\U!relse)
by worshitr-not by proofs. 9
Climacus, then, seems to agree with Plantinga that a person can know God's
reality in a direct manner, without any arguments or proof. Climacus, in fact,
goes beyond the claim that such arguments are unnecessary to the claim that
they are positively harmful, a claim which is echoed in Plantinga's discussion
of "Reformed Theologians" like Bavinck, Calvin, and Barth, who say very
similar things. 10
II. Plantinga's Arguments for the Reasonableness of Taking Belief in God as
Properly Basic

Kierkegaard is often stigmatized as an irrational fideist, in part because of his
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attitude towards arguments for God's existence." If Kierkegaard's views here
are as similar to Plantinga as I have claimed, then anyone who wishes to evaluate
Kierkegaard's view on this issue would do well to pay attention to the arguments
Plantinga gi ves for the reasonableness of taking belief in God as properly basic.
The argument is basically negative in character. That is, Plantinga does not
propose a criterion of proper basicality and show that belief in God meets this
criterion. 12 Instead, he considers the conditions which others have proposed for
proper basicality which are supposed to exclude belief in God as properly basic,
and shows that it is not reasonable to accept those conditions as necessary for
proper basicality.
As Plantinga understands the matter, those who have thought that belief in
God could not be properly basic have generally been classical foundationalists. 13
Classical foundationalists, by which Plantinga means medieval thinkers like
Aquinas, modem classical philosophers like Descartes, and contemporary philosophers like Chisholm, hold that a proposition can be properly basic for someone
if and only if it is either self-evident to that person or "evident to the senses"
(medieval foundationalists), or self-evident or "incorrigible" (modern and contemporary foundationalists).14 They have further held that for a proposition to
be rationally acceptable it must be either properly basic or based on propositions
which are properly basic. Since "God exists" is not self-evident, and is neither
evident to the senses (like "some things are in motion") nor incorrigible (like "I
seem to see a tree" or "1 am appeared greenly to"), it follows that belief in God
cannot be properly basic. Some classical foundationalists, like Aquinas, have
thought that belief in God, though not properly basic, could be derived from
propositions that were. Others, like Russell, have thought that belief in God was
not rational at all. What Plantinga tries to do therefore is to discredit the restrictive
claims of classical foundationalism about what can properly go in the foundation.
Essentially, he has two arguments. The first is that classical foundational ism
entails that we are not rationally justified in accepting many propositions which
we all in fact believe and regard as rational. Plantinga believes that it can be
shown that propositions that entail that "there are enduring physical objects, or
that there are persons distinct from myself, or that the world has existed for
more than five minutes" cannot be rationally accepted if classical foundational ism
is true. 15 The reason is simply that such propositions are neither self-evident,
evident to the senses, nor incorrigible; nor can any of them be shown to be more
probable than not on the basis of what is self-evident or incorrigible. Planting a
feels it would be irrational to regard these beliefs as irrational; hence if classical
foundationalism entails this, then classical foundationalism is irrational.
Plantinga's second argument against classical foundationalism is that the foundationalist position is self-referentially inconsistent. The foundationalist accepts
"(33) A is properly basic for me only if A is self-evident or incorrigible or
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evident to the senses for me. "16 Yet (33) is not itself properly basic, since it is
not self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses, and no one knows any
good arguments for (33) which are based on what is self-evident, incorrigible,
or evident to the senses. Since the classical foundationalist holds that it is irrational
to accept a belief unless the belief meets one of those two conditions, it is
evidently irrational for a classical foundationalist to accept (33).
Plantinga concludes that there is no basis for the charge that it is irrational
for someone to take belief in God as properly basic. Someone who does so "is
not violating any epistemic duties or revealing a defect in his noetic structure ... the correct or proper way to believe in God ... is to take belief in
God as basic."17
If Plantinga' s arguments are strong here, then it seems that Kierkegaard cannot
justifiably be called an irrational fideist on the basis of his view that it is proper
for a person to believe in God without any arguments or proof. Kierkegaard' s
position here is a version of what Plantinga has termed "Reformed epistemology,"
though perhaps a Kierkegaardian would prefer to term the position "Lutheran
epistemology. "
III. Could Kierkegaard Accept Plantinga's Arguments Against Classical
F oundationalism?

Kierkegaard's main epistemological target was not classical foundationalism
but Hegelian idealistic coherentism. Hence it is hardly to be expected that the
epistemological underpinnings he provides for his views would exactly parallel
Plantinga's. Nevertheless, I believe that when one considers Kierkegaard's views
in their historical contexts, there are arguments present which are roughly
analogous to the two arguments Plantinga presents against classical foundationalism. This makes it plausible, I think, to speculate that a contemporary
Kierkegaardian might well find Plantinga's arguments appealing in the contemporary situation.
The first Kierkegaardian argument to be considered is again from Climacus
in the "Interlude" to the Philosophical Fragments. There, drawing on ancient
skepticism, Climacus argues that all factual knowledge, all knowledge of what
has "come into existence," is dependent on "faith."'s The reason this is so is
that the apprehension of what has "come-into-existence" always involves some
degree of uncertainty, which must be resolved by faith.
This Kierkegaardian passage is often thought to lean on a voluntaristic view
of belief. In one passage Climacus says that "doubt can be overcome only by a
free act, an act of will. "19 On this interpretation Kierkegaard is basically arguing
that faith is a free, and ultimately ungrounded act. But since faith is required
toacquire all of our beliefs about matters of fact, there is no reason to think faith
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can be avoided with respect to religious knowledge, or that it should be.
This "voluntaristic" reading of this passage is plausible. One finds a clear
statement of this view in Terence Penelhum's very insightful book, God and
Skepticism,>o and in Louis Pojman's recent The Logic of Subjectivity. 21 If this is
Kierkegaard's view, it is open to strong objections, since beliefs do not usually
appear to be under our voluntary control in this manner.
I myself do not believe that this voluntaristic reading of the Climacus material
is correct, primarily because it fails to take account of the extent to which
"willing" in Kierkegaard is bound up with the related phenomena of the unconscious and self-deception. To say that I am committed to a position because I
have freely willed it is for Kierkegaard by no means to imply that I am conscious
of having voluntarily chosen it; still less does it imply that I have the power to
alter the commitment. 22
However, regardless of who is right on the question of interpretation, the more
interesting question is whether or not a sound point can be salvaged (or reconstructed) from the Kierkegaardian position. If the alleged voluntarism ofClimacus
is discarded, the logical core which remains seems to be this: If a person tried
to exclude from his noetic structure all those beliefs which were not objectively
certain (self-evident or incorrigible?) he would exclude all beliefs about matters
which have "come-into-existence" (beliefs like "the world is more than five
minutes old" or "there are other beings with minds"). Since all people except
complete, consistent skeptics (i.e., all people) do include such beliefs in their
noetic structures, one cannot reasonably demand that people limit their beliefacquisitions to what is objectively certain. People somehow commit themselves
or find themselves committed to beliefs which go beyond what is self-evident,
or incorrigible, or derivable from what is self-evident or incorrigible.
Climacus says this shows the impact of the will on the acquisition of beliefs,
and some thereby take him to mean that people can simply decide what to believe
and what not to believe directly. I myself think that Climacus is quite aware of
how difficult it is to modify a belief (note his comments on how difficult genuine
skepticism really is), and therefore in speaking of "will" wants only to highlight
our ultimate personal responsibility for our beliefs (since we can to a large extent
modify them indirectly over time and in cases where we are unable to modify
them our inability is often grounded in aspects of our character we have freely
assumed and are therefore responsible for.) But in any case the point remains
that a reasonable person believes many things which are neither self-evident,
incorrigible, or derivable from what is self-evident or incorrigible. Kierkegaard
would concur with Plantinga's criticism of classical foundationalism.
It is important not to misread Kierkegaard or Plantinga here. They are not
attempting to argue for skepticism, and then use skepticism as a basis for fideism,
as Penelhum assumes. 23 That is, it is not an argument that since no one really
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knows anything the religious believer is as entitled to his "leaps of faith" as
anyone else. Rather, the assumption is that we do know some things, but that
it must be conceded that our actual knowledge is not derivable solely from what
is objectively certain. A subjective contribution must be acknowledged.
Plantinga puts this point in a perspicuous manner. He says that a natural worry
for someone who rejects classical foundationalism is whether or not just any
belief could be properly basic. Could, for example, a belief in the great pumpkin
be properly basic? Plantinga says no. The Reformed epistemologist may hold
that God has implanted in us a natural tendency to see his hand in the world
around us, but "the same cannot be said for the Great Pumpkin, there being no
Great Pumpkin and no natural tendency to accept beliefs about the Great
Pumpkin. "24
This seems terribly high-handed and question-begging, but it is not. The basis
of Plantinga's claim here is his conviction that the proper way to come up with
criteria of what it is rational to hold as properly basic, or to believe at all, is to
rely, in a broad sense, on induction. 25 That is, one cannot hope to suspend all
beliefs in a Cartesian manner until one has criteria of rationally acceptable beliefs.
Rather one must begin with our actual commitments, what we are SUbjectively
willing to accept as rational, and use these commitments as examples to test
hypotheses about epistemological criteria. To me it is obvious that this puts
personal commitments-subjectivity in a Kierkegaardian sense-into the heart
of the knowing process.
IV. Self-Referential Inconsistency and Absent-Mindedness

Plantinga's second argument against classical foundationalism, it will be recalled, was that the classical foundationalist was self-referentially inconsistent in
believing a principle (restrict your beliefs to what is self-evident, incorrigible,
or derivable from what is self-evident or incorrigible) which cannot be rationally
accepted, because it undermines itself. Essentially this argument is a claim that
the attempt to eliminate subjectivity from the knowing process backfires because
the very attempt is rooted in SUbjectivity.
This argument is, like the former one of Plantinga's, at least Kierkegaardian
in spirit. It recalls the many jests of Johannes Climacus against the Hegelian
claim to have achieved the ability to think from the perspective of absolute spirit.
From Climacus' viewpoint this was an attempt to eliminate subjectivity and
assume the standpoint of "pure thought."26 Such a standpoint Climacus regards
as ethically unjustifiable, since it is every person's duty first to live as a human
being, a task which is by no means exhausted by speculative thinking. Nevertheless, he says that one does an "injustice" to the "objective tendency" by simply
attacking it on ethical grounds, since in that case "one has nothing in common
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with what is under attack."27 I think Climacus simply means by this that such a
criticism will be shrugged off by the "pure thinker" as irrelevant, since such a
thinker sees his project as essentially disinterested understanding. Instead
Climacus says that one must begin with the "comical," which lies within the
sphere of the metaphysical. 28
The comical aspect of the project of "pure thought" is that it is a project of a
thinker who is never pure. The thinker who neglects his own existence is "systematically absent-minded." The decision to think abstractly is not itself abstract,
but the act of an existing individual. 29 Besides being immoral, it is impossible
to think in a way that precludes one's being an existing individual, limited in
knowledge and experience, permeated by commitments and passions which are
not justifiable by any thought which occurs antecedent to and uncontaminated
by those passions and commitments.
V. Seeking a Ground for Properly Basic Beliefs

So far my project has basically been to point out parallels between Kierkegaard
and Plantinga in their positions, and to suggest that Plantinga's arguments and
their Kierkegaardian analogues provide reasons to absolve Kierkegaard from the
charge of irrational fideism, to the degree that this charge is rooted in his espousal
of belief in God without any philosophical basis. In the remainder of the paper,
I want to suggest that Kierkegaard has something to add to Plantinga's project:
a fleshing out of the notion that properly basic beliefs are nonetheless "grounded."
Plantinga says clearly that though belief in God is properly basic, it does not
follow that such belief is groundless. 3u By this he means, I think, that though
belief in God is not based on arguments or on any other beliefs, or any evidence
understandable in terms of knowing something expressible in propositional form,
such a belief is nevertheless not arbitrary. Something underlies the belief, and
makes it reasonable for me to hold the belief. Plantinga expresses this by speaking
of "justifying circumstances."3!
When we look at propositions like "I see a tree," "I had breakfast this morning,"
and "That person is in pain" we find that when these propositions are properly
basic for me, it is because of characteristic experiences like "being appeared
treely to," or seeing someone display typical pain behavior, for example, It is
not that 1 infer the beliefs in question from any other beliefs, but that certain
experiences play a crucial role in both forming and justifying the beliefs in
question. Thus for every properly basic belief "there will be some true proposition
of the sort 'In condition C, S is justified in taking p as basic. '''32
Planting a says a similar story can be told about belief in God. There are
"justifying circumstances" for the belief. 33 God has created us in such a way that
certain characteristic experiences trigger a natural tendency or disposition to
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believe in God. 'There is in us a disposition to believe propositions of the sort
this flower was created by God or this vast and intricate universe was created
by God when we contemplate the flower or behold the starry heavens or think
about the vast reaches of the universe.""
It is of course hardly surprising that atheists and religious skeptics find this
account less than convincing. Why, they ask, is it the case that virtually everyone
has a natural tendency to believe in trees when appeared to treely, while great
numbers of people seem to have no tendency to believe in God when they see
a flower?
The obvious move at this point for Plantinga is to suggest that our natural
tendency to believe in God has been "overlaid or suppressed by sin."3s The
atheist may find this a cheap victory, since it smacks of ad hominem. Plantinga
could of course at this point simply shrug and say that he is simply telling it
like it is, and if the atheist does not agree, that is the atheist's problem. (I am
not suggesting that this is in fact what Plantinga would do at this point.) There
are, however, some good reasons not to break off the conversation so abruptly.
First, some of the atheists who find this move a little high-handed may not
be hostile opponents, but sincere seekers, honestly looking for an account of the
reasonableness of belief in God which they can accept. Secondly, some of the
people who find this story of the natural tendency to believe in God dubious are
not atheists at all, but believers who think one should and can have arguments
for God's existence. Of course the sin that overrides this natural tendency may
be at work in believers as well as unbelievers. Nevertheless, in the light of all
those who find such an account dubious, it is worthwhile to see if the conversation
can be continued. Is there anything Plantinga can do to make his account more
plausible?
I believe that the answer is "yes." Plantinga himself sees part of what is needed:
There are therefore many conditions and circumstances that call forth
belief in God: guilt. gratitude, danger, a sense of God's presence, a
sense that he speaks, perception of various parts of the universe. A
complete job would explore the phenomenology of all these conditions
and of more besides. 36
Such a phenomenology of the conditions which serve as the ground of belief
in God would be helpful in two ways. First, a fuller account would make it more
understandable why the tendency is actualized in some but not others. Secondly,
this fuller account of the ground of belief in God would provide the honest seeker
with a point of contact.
Such an account would need to be accompanied by a fuller account of the
action of sin in suppressing or overlaying this natural tendency to believe. Just
what is sin, and why does it have this effect? Particularly, why does it have this
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effect on some people and not on others?

VI. Subjectivity as the Ground of Belief in God

What I want to suggest is that a good part of this fuller phenomenology of
the ground of belief in God has been provided for Planting a by Kierkegaard. In
providing this fuller account Kierkegaard also gives a plausible, non ad hoc
explanation of why belief in God lacks the universality of many types of properly
basic beliefs, and also why many believers do not see belief in God as properly
basic.
We have already noted that Plantinga thinks that at least some properly basic
beliefs are triggered in certain circumstances because of certain natural tendencies
or dispositions, whose operation is, however, impaired in the case of belief in
God because of sin. What Kierkegaard adds to this account is that all such
"natural knowledge" in the case of religious knowledge is conditioned by what
Kierkegaard caIIs "inwardness" or "subjectivity." It is of course a daunting task
to say what "inwardness" is for Kierkegaard. Here I will simply say that by
"inwardness" Kierkegaard means to refer to the central enduring concerns that
give shape and substance to the personality, concerns that have both a dispositional
character Ca willingness to renounce the relative for the sake of the absolute")
and an episodic character ("passion is momentary"). (How something can have
both kinds of characteristics is an interesting story, not to be told here.) These
concerns are not simply "naturally" present in the individual; they are formed
and the individual has the ability to assist or retard their development. Those
concerns which are essential to becoming a true self have a moral and religious
character, and they are closely tied to a distinctive type of self-understanding.
By claiming that an awareness of God is conditioned by inwardness, Kierkegaard certainly means that experiences such as guilt and gratitude, which
Plantinga refers to as "justifying circumstances," can give rise to religious knowledge. But he does not mean to exclude experiences of the vastness or complexity
of nature. He merely wants to insist that such experiences lead to an awareness
of God only when they are mediated by the proper kind of subjectivity. "Within
the individual person there is a potentiality (man is potentially spirit) which is
awakened in inwardness to a God-relationship, and then it becomes possible to
see God everywhere. "37
An enormous part of Kierkegaard's literature is devoted to descriptions and
analyses of inwardness, and, insofar as one human being can do so for another,
attempts to help others develop these qualities. In the remainder of this paper,
I do not wish to try to summarize those descriptions, an enormous job indeed. 3s
Rather, I want to try to sketch why Kierkegaard thinks the knowledge of God
should be thus dependent on inwardness. The fact that religious knowledge is
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conditioned by inwardness has several desirable consequences, consequences
which make it plausible to think that if God does exist, then this is precisely
how one would expect him to make possible a knowledge of himself. I will
briefly describe some of these consequences.
I. If the knowledge of God is conditioned by inwardness, human freedom is
protected. A loving God would want human beings to serve him freely and out
of love. Since God is omnipotent and omniscient, if his presence were too
obvious to human beings, it is evident that many who do not really love God
would find it prudent to worship and serve him, for self-interested reasons. In
that case such people would really be coerced into serving God, and their freedom
would be severely curtailed. By only making himself known to those with a
certain type of morallreligious concern, God ensures that a know ledge of himself
is not forced on those who are really unwilling to serve him.
2. If the knowledge of God is conditioned by inwardness, human equality is
protected. It is an article of faith with Kierkegaard that God is impartial, "no
respecter of persons." If the knowledge of God were conditioned by intellectual
acuity, this principle would be violated, since humans are obviously unequal in
intelligence. However, S. K. believes that all human beings are essentially equal
in their capacity for inwardness. Moral and religious passion can be found equally
in the rich and the poor, the educated and the ignorant, the intelligent and the
simple. Basing religious knowledge on inwardness makes it clear how such
knowledge can be equally available to all without being universally present.
3. If the knowledge of God is conditioned by inwardness, then the process of
coming to know God will be a process in which the individual is spiritually
developed. In the last section of Practice in Christianity, Anti-Climacus discusses
the theme that Christ will "draw all men to himself."39 One of the major themes
he develops in this context is that Christ draws men to himself without attempting
to entice, allure, or seduce them. This is grounded in a tender care for the
spiritual well-being of the individual. Since God is the individual's highest good,
it would be absurd to maintain that the process of coming to know God would
be one which led away from personal growth. If, however, the knowledge of
God is conditioned by the development of those very qualities which are crucial
to the development of a self in the crucial sense of the term "self," then it is
sure to be the case that coming to know God will make the individual more truly
himself or herself.
4. If the knowledge of God is conditioned by inwardness, then it is ensured
that the person who becomes aware of God becomes aware of God's true nature.
Kierkegaard holds that since God is spirit, he cannot be known in just any old
fashion, but only through a spiritual relationship. The absurdity of thinking that
belief in God could be grounded in anything else is argued by way of a humoristic
thought experiment. Kierkegaard's pseudonym Climacus asks us to imagine a
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social conformist who lacks inwardness and therefore has no true awareness of
God. Perhaps God might be able to help this person by appearing to him in
some unusual form. Maybe such a person could see God if God were to take
the form of "a very rare and tremendously large green bird, with a red beak,
sitting in a tree on the mound, and perhaps even whistling in an unheard of
manner."40 The problem with this idea is of course that the social conformist
might thereby become aware of God but he would not become aware of God as
God. He would still totally lack any knowledge of God's true character.
If, however, the knowledge of God is conditioned by inwardness, the situation
is totally different. For the person who has properly developed such inward
passions as gratitude, guilt, and repentance will be in the proper situation to
understand such divine qualities as "the gracious giver of every good gift," "the
one who offers forgiveness," and "the one who empowers the individual to make
a new beginning."
Also, it will be clear that the experiences and "justifying circumstances" in
question will not be accidental "happenings" in the life of the believer. They
will be normal occurrences, which are made possible by certain long-term inner
virtues of the believer.
VII. Subjectivity and Sin

Making the knowledge of God conditional upon inwardness is therefore a
plausible view of religious knowledge in itself. It is no ad hoc device to save
religious knowledge from refutation. Nevertheless, this view also explains in a
convincing manner why the knowledge of God is less than universal.
First of all, we can now say why it is that sin blocks the operation of the
natural tendency or disposition which God has placed in humans. For Kierkegaard
sin can be described as a failure to become one's true self or as a rebellion
against God. These are basically equivalent because one can only be one's true
self through being grounded in God, and God commands each of us to become
our true selves. One becomes one's true self through the development of the
right kind of subjectivity, through developing the right kinds of passion. To
sinfully fail to become a self is therefore to lack the proper kind of inwardness
and this means that one's ability to know God will be blocked or severely
hampered.
Obviously, this also explains the lack of universality. Since the disposition to
believe in God only operates properly when the proper inwardness is present,
the lack of such inwardness obviously means the operation of the disposition
will be retarded in many. (It does not follow from the universality of sin that
this disposition would be blocked in everyone, nor that it would be retarded to
the same degree in everyone, since sin may have various effects on the personality,
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and in any case God could providentially over-ride the effects of sin in some
cases.)
We can also explain why it is that some who believe in God nevertheless fail
to see that his reality can be properly basic and think that one needs arguments
to properly believe in God. There are at least two possible types of believers
here. First, there may be believers in God whose belief is properly basic, but
who are unaware of this fact. They may be confident of God's reality by virtue
of a disposition to believe in him which is mediated by inwardness, but fail to
realize the true status of their belief. They accept various arguments or proofs
and believe that these are the basis of their belief, when in fact it is their
confidence in God's reality which underlies their acceptance of these proofs.
Or, they may sense that such a belief is basic for them (or perhaps for others)
but fail to realize that holding a belief in this manner can be proper.
The second group of theists who don't accept the claim that belief in God can
be properly basic consists of those for whom such a belief is not in fact properly
basic. This is possible because of the ambiguity of the term "believer." When
we speak of someone as a "believer in God" we may mean merely that such a
person believes certain propositions such as "God exists." However, to be a
believer in the decisive Christian sense, one must possess a kind of faith which
does not consist merely in an intellectual belief, but in passionate inward qualities
like trust. Clearly there are many theists who believe in the former sense but
not in the latter. Thus there may be many people who are not atheists, nominal
believers, parts of "Christendom" in Kierkegaard's polemical sense, who lack
the requisite inwardness, or lack it to a degree which impairs the natural tendency
or disposition to believe in God. And even people who possess genuine faith
which is more than intellectual assent may be in a similar position since sin
continues to operate in the lives of believers as well as unbelievers.
My conclusions are simple: (1) Alvin Plantinga's view of belief in God as
properly basic provides an illuminating way to understand Kierkegaard's view
of belief in God. (2) Kierkegaard's view of inwardness or subjectivity as conditioning the knowledge of God provides an illuminating way of fleshing out
Plantinga's suggestion that belief in God, though not based on any arguments
or evidence, is nonetheless grounded and in some sense justified.
St. Olaf College

NOTES
All references to the Danish text refer to the first edition of Kierkegaard's
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